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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING * PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND HEATING, * 
* 
Plaintifl7Appellee * 
vs. * CaseNo.970580-CA 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN * APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah Corporation * COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, 
* JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
Defendants/Appellants, * 
* Priority No. 15 
* Trial Court Cases: 
* 940300014CN 
* 940000012CV 
* 940000013CV 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
COMES NOW the Defendants/Appellants, Thomas Guy, Diane Quinn, and Aspen 
Construction, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Aspen"), by and through their attorney, 
Joseph M. Chambers of Harris, Preston, & Chambers, and pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah R. App. 
P., petitions this Court for rehearing and clarification as to the issue of Aspen's attorney fees and 
costs on this appeal and reconsideration of the issue of manifest error of the trial court in granting the 
Plaintifl?Appellee's Motion to Reopen absent a finding of a specific ground under Rule 59 U.R.C.P. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
1. In order to expedite disposition by the trial court upon remand, Aspen seeks 
clarification by this Court of the issue of Aspen's attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. The 
Court's opinion filed March 18,1999, makes no mention of the attorney fees and costs incurred by 
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Aspen on this appeal and in order to prevent confusion on remand on the issue, the Appellant 
respectfully petitions for clarification on this point. 
2. Aspen also requests this Court to reconsider the portion of its opinion dealing with 
the "Motion to Reopen" in light of the absence of a finding by the trial court of any of the specific 
grounds set forth in Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P. in violation of the Supreme Court's ruling in Hancock v. 
Planned Development Corp., infra. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. The judgment from which Aspen appealed was entered by the trial court on April 7, 
1997. 
2. Aspen appealed the judgment, resulting in this Court's issuance of the opinion filed 
March 18,1999. The trial court's judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for 
rehearing consistent with the Court's opinion. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The facts surrounding Aspen's appeal regarding the attorney fees awarded by the trial 
court are set forth in the Brief of Appellants "Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court 
Below," pages 12-13. 
2. In the Brief of Appellants, Aspen requested attorney fees and costs on this appeal in 
its "Argument" to which references also are made in the Brief of Appellants in the "Table of 
Contents," "Statement of Facts," "Summary of Arguments," and "Conclusion." 
3. The facts surrounding Aspen's appeal regarding the trial court granting the Motion 
to Reopen are set forth in the Brief of Appellants "Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court 
Below," page 12, and "Argument," part II, pages 31-33, and Appellants' Reply Brief, pages 4-6. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCURRED ON APPEAL 
No mention was made in the Court's opinion filed March 18, 1999, of the attorney fees and 
costs incurred by Aspen on appeal, and in order to avoid confusion on remand the Appellant 
respectfully petitions for clarification on this point. Counsel for Aspen is concerned that because the 
Court's opinion does not clearly address the issue of attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal that 
the trial court would be inclined - even bound to follow the strict letter of the Court's opinion and 
will not consider such on remand since no express provision is made or discussed in the opinion. 
Clarification on this point is in the interest of judicial economy and will expedite ultimate disposition 
of these two remaining issues (costs and attorney fees) by the trial court. 
The propriety of including an award of attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal when the 
underlying claim allows an award of attorney fees is well established. R&R Energies v. Mother Earth 
Industries. Inc., 936 P.2d 1068, 1081 (Utah 1997); Management Services Corp. v. Development 
Associates. 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980); J. V. Hatch Construction Inc. v. Kampros. 1998 W.L. 
893236, 359 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 22 (Utah App. 1998). 
In light of the Court's opinion reversing the trial court as to the HVAC portion of the 
mechanics' lien claim, as well as the insufficient evidentiary basis for the attorney fees awarded 
Whipple, Aspen respectfully submits that it is the prevailing party on appeal and is entitled to its 
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. (J. V. Hatch, supra p. 22.) 
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II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE RULE OF LAW 
ESTABLISHED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN 
HANCOCK V. PLANNED DEVELOPMENT CORP.. THAT A 
TRIAL COURT HAS NO DISCRETION TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL ABSENT A FINDING OF ONE OF THE SPECIFIC 
GROUNDS SET FORTH IN RULE 59 (a) U.R.C.P. 
The Court's opinion holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the 
Plaintiffs Motion to Reopen, notwithstanding the trial court's failure to make a finding of one of the 
requisite grounds set forth in Rule 59 U.R.C.P. In support of this conclusion, the Court quotes 
language from the 1976 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Lewis v. Porter. 556 P.2d 496, 497 
(Utah 1976). 
This Court's opinion (paragraphs 22 to 24) fails to reconcile its holding with the Rule of Law 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Hancock v. Planned Development Corp.. 791 P.2d 183, 
185 (Utah 1990). In Hancock, the Utah Supreme Court citing its earlier decision of Tangaro v. 
Marrero. 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962) stated: 
"However the trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial absent 
a showing of one of the grounds specified in the Rule" [59 (a) 
U.R.C.P.] Hancock, page 185. 
This Court's opinion is also inconsistent with the statement by the Utah Supreme Court in footnote 
2 in the Tangaro case: 
"It is elementary that the trial court has no discretion to grant a new 
trial absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Footnote 2, Tangaro p. 391). 
c.f. Hulme v. Small Claims Court of Murray Citv. 590 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah 1979) ("Subdivision (e) 
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of Rule 59 provides a time limitation for this type of motion, which is directed to the Court for 
rehearing of its own judgment. Such motions must be based on one of more of the grounds set forth 
in subdivision (a).") 
Furthermore, the Court's comment in paragraph 24 that "the documents sought to be 
introduced by the Motion to Reopen were exhibits to Whipple's complaint served on Aspen to 
commence the actions..." not only misstates the law, but begs the question. These documents were 
not admitted into evidence until after the Motion to Reopen was granted. As Justice Stewart 
observed in his dissent in Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Utah 1981): 
In a case that has been tried, it is improper for this Court on appeal to 
rely on, or even consider, a document which is in the file but not 
introduced into evidence. "The mere fact that a document is in the file 
does not permit this court to consider it as being before this court." 
Adamsonv.Brockbanle 112 Utah 52, 78, 185 P.2d 264, 277 (1947). 
It is inappropriate for appellate courts to rely on documents not 
admitted in evidence. Davis v. Long. Mo.App., 521 S.W.2d 7 (1975). 
We are limited to considering only the trial record and what may be 
conceded by an adverse party. Harding v. Brown. 144 Ind. App. 528, 
247 N.E.2d 536 (1969); State v. Galeenen Mo., 402 S.W.2d 336 
(1966); Petti v.Herre. Mo., 403 S.W. 2d 568 (1966); Klieeev. Iowa 
Employment Security Commission. Iowa. 206N.W.2d 123 (1973). 
Nor may a trier of fact, whether a judge or jury, consider evidence 
not properly introduced. Simpson v. Woodham Fla.App., 332 So.2d 
693 (1976). (Dissenting opinion) 
The issue is not whether the documents were unexpected, nor is it whether Aspen, Guy and 
Quinn received a full and fair consideration of the issues. The issue is simply this: can the trial court, 
following trial but before formal entry of the judgment, reopen the matter to admit additional evidence 
absent a showing of one of the grounds specified in the Rule 59 (a) U.R.C.P.? The Supreme Court 
says the answer to this question is "no." Hancock, supra p. 185. 
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Counsel for the Appellant fully appreciates that the appellate courts concede to the trial courts 
a considerable amount of discretion in matters pending before them; however, the rules established 
by the Utah Supreme Court are in place to accord uniformity of law in trial proceedings. The Utah 
Supreme Court has recognized that one of its foremost responsibilities is to insure the legal accuracy 
and uniformity of the laws of this state. Willey v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). The 
principle articulated by the Court in this portion of its opinion is in conflict with the Rule of Law as 
pronounced by the Utah Supreme Court in the Hancock decision. A trial court has no discretion 
absent a finding of one of the specific grounds contained in Rule 59 U.R.C.P to grant a new trial no 
matter how compelling the reason the trial court may find for granting a new trial. To allow this 
decision to be published in its present form would create a conflict between this Court's decision and 
prior decisions of the Supreme Court, creating potential grounds for a writ of certiorari. 
Not only is the standard articulated in the Court's opinion inconsistent with Hancock, it will 
create unnecessary confusion in the case law and is bad public policy. The illusory standard of "in 
the interests of justice" will adversely affect the orderly administration of justice by inviting motions 
for new trials in virtually every trial proceeding. Adopting a standard upholding a trial court's 
discretion based only upon the trial court's subjective determination of what is "in the interest of 
justice" can only lead to uncertainties, increased litigation and a judicial system lacking uniform 
application of the rule of law. In essence, this Court embraces a standard with no predictable 
outcome and each individual motion for a new trial will turn solely on the particular judicial 
personalities involved in hearing the matter and the creative grounds a moving party's attorney can 
articulate as being "in the interests of justice." As observed by Judge Stewart in the decision of In 
Re: Knaus. 43 B.C 63 (Bank Mo. 1985), the standard essentially articulated by this Court will "fatally 
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undermine the essential judicial concepts of stability and finality of judgments and make justice almost 
wholly a question of the vicissitudes of judicial personality." In Re* Knaus. supra p. 65. It will invite 
needless additional litigation and re-examination of matters post trial (as it did in this case) with the 
additional costs to the parties and the already overburdened court system. Appellant's counsel 
Tespectfutty suggests that this Court cannot reconcile the standard enunciated in its opinion with the 
Rule of Law established by the Utah Supreme Court in Hancock and Tangaro. 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Joseph M Chambers of Harris, Preston, & Chambers hereby certifies that this Petition is 
presented in good faith and not for delay. 
CONCLUSION 
Aspen respectfully requests that this court grant the Petition for Rehearing and the relief 
requested herein. 
DATED this 3>l day of March 1999. 
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